Friday 11 November 2011

Class note on Political Theology


Towards a Political Theology in the
 ambit of Indian secularism

Fr. D. John Romus

Introduction
Political theology developed in the 1960s in Europe. It is a theological critique of a secularised Europe, an offshoot of the Enlightenment that relied on reason to solve social and political problems and relegated religion to private realm. Johannes B. Metz, a principal person of this theological movement, says that the primary task of political theology is to deprivatise Christian faith as to show its permanent value for public discourse in dealing with socio-political realities.[1]

The Indian situation is different. The Constitution of India provides a particular form of Secular State which does not exclude or marginalise religion from the public sphere but provides a political and social order wherein no one religion is preferred to the others. Positively, it means that all religions are entitled, in their specific identities, to equal protection of the State. Precisely, this approach calls for separation of the State from religion to make this polity to function so that the political goods of all communities are protected by the State. This happens only when the State is non-partisan, but keeps a “principled distance” from all religions. In other words, the State in India maintains a reasonable approach towards religion.

The framers of the Constitution saw religious diversity respects human dignity. This should not be legislated away but should be incorporated into the Constitution. Thus they ensured it by making secularism one of the constitutive premises of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution.[2] Consequently, Constitution recognises the inalienable worth and dignity of every person as a moral subject to seek the truth and to organize one’s way of life alone or in community in accordance with one’s conviction of conscience.[3] This goes with the humanistic philosophy of the Constitution which is founded on some substantive values as enshrined in the Preamble to the Constitution and in Part III and IV of the Constitution that protect the dignity and social nature of human person.

Similarly, Christian approach to human person and political community (state) are also centred on the dignity and social nature of human person as they are founded on imago Dei theology.[4] In this background, Political theology in the ambit of Indian secularism would be a humanising and collaborative theology committed to substantive human values and ethical policies. It will be a proactive theology to galvanise the humanising potentials to faith communities in the country to liberate from the forces of dehumanisation widespread in the country. Hence, this paper intends to clarify the concept of Political secularism, secular provisions and religious pluralism, Constitution’s principled approach towards religion, religious freedom and human dignity, Stat’s aid to religion, humanistic character of Indian secularism, dignity centred political theology and political theology and ethics of interhuman concern.

1. The concept of political secularism

It is generally accepted among scholars that secularism, as a political ideology for the governance of the State, advocates separation of the State from religion.[5] Depending on the nature of separation, there are different forms of secular States. It is called political secularism because the separation of the State from religion is intended for the creation of a secure political order where the citizens may organise their daily life[6] free from religious conflicts; or when such conflicts arise, these could be resolved amicably. Its aim is different from religion, which deals with ultimate ideals of life towards a higher time or a higher order of things with an eschatological ring. These are beyond the aim and the competence of a secular State.

The origin point of the political secularism was the wars of religion that ravaged the Western Christendom in the aftermath of the Reformation and the growth of denominational Churches, and the eventual creation of the nation-states. In this conflict ridden situation, the need arose to search in battle fatigue for a political order so that people of different confessional persuasions might coexist in peace and organise their ordinary life in a decent way, free from religious wrangling and violence.[7] This meant, in practice, to separate the state from religion in some form so that the public domain had to be regulated by some constitutional norms, which were independent of confessional allegiance. These norms must be capable of ensuring a sense of tolerance and public order in the society.[8]

The present day concept of political secularism, as we have it in the liberal democratic tradition, emerged from these basic principles. However, the significance of political secularism cannot be properly gauged when viewed exclusively in the milieu of Western Christian denominational conflicts. Whenever and wherever interreligious or intrareligious conflicts and violence become uncontrollable and unbearable, something similar to political secularism arises intending to protect the citizens from a persistent clash of ultimate ideals and religiously motivated denominational or community interests.

The contemporary approach to political secularism depends upon the mode of interpretation given to the nature of separation involved between the State and religion in the public sphere. Rajeev Bhargava suggests that essentially, there are two kinds of approaches. The first kind identifies separation with total exclusion of religion from the public domain.[9] Accordingly, it has been suggested that the secular State upholds no religion, pursues no religious goals. Religiously defined-goods have no place in the catalogue of ends the State promotes. Implicit in this approach is the belief that religion is irrelevant to public life. Religion, where it really counts in people’s lives and commitments, essentially exists in the private sphere. This seems to be one of the widely accepted views in the Western world about the separation of the State from the Church.[10] In its extreme form, the first kind of secular political approach identifies separation with extrusion of religion from the public square and the State tends to become hostile towards religion. The typical example of this kind is the Constitution of the former Soviet Union, which recognized the freedom to antireligious propaganda but not religious propaganda.[11]

The second kind of approach does not demand total exclusion of religion but identifies separation as setting boundaries or as maintaining distance between the state and religion in the public domain. This form of approach sees separation in terms of “principled distance.”[12] Accordingly, the second kind of approach holds the view that it is possible for the co-existence of religion and the state in the public sphere. Both constitute two distinct spheres in the society with their own respective areas of jurisdiction to care for the religious and secular needs of the people. Each is valuable in its own right. They respect each other as well as their own limits. Therefore, the State maintains a principled distance from religion in the public domain.

In the governance of the State, the idea of principled distance operates either through a policy of neutrality towards religions or through a policy of equidistant from religions. Positively speaking, both maintain a reasonable approach towards religion. The purpose of the neutrality policy is to avoid the state interference in the religious affairs. Similarly, the state keeps equidistant from religions so that it may not be partial to any particular religion.[13]

The Constitution of the United States of America is considered to be a typical example of state’s neutrality towards religion. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, most of the States had State Churches. When the Constitution was adopted in 1787, the United States became a secular State in the sense that no religious test was needed to hold a public office.[14] Later in 1791, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution declared that the Congress was to follow a policy of neutrality in religious matters, which is construed as not to interfere with matters of religion.[15] The First Amendment to U.S. Constitution dealt with two distinct matters in relation to religion. They are referred to as the “non-establishment clause” and “the free exercise clause”. The non-establishment clause prohibits the state from establishing or preferring any religion. The free exercise clause prohibits the state from interfering in religious matters.

There are some states, depending upon their historical antecedents, recognise a particular religion as state religion. However, in the political affairs of the state, they follow the policy of separation in terms of equidistant from all religions and prohibit religious intrusion into the political affairs of the state. In other words, the state is not partisan to any religion in its political function and in the distribution of the political goods to citizens. The most characteristic example is the United Kingdom where the Anglican Church is the established Church with the King / Queen as its head.[16] Nevertheless, the State gives full freedom to all religions and equal liberty of conscience and worship to all citizens. Countries like Ireland[17] and Cambodia[18] are of this category. In these States, separation is taken to mean setting boundaries between the state and religion and their co-existence in the public sphere.

Political secularism also found its expression in the Constitution of India. As a political concept, it stands for the separation of the State from religion, equal protection of all religions and active opposition to communalism.[19] Indian secularism is a combination of two streams of thought, the Western and the Indian.[20] The Western concept has been contextualised in accordance with India’s culture of religious pluralism. In this process of synthesis, the content of the Western political secularism has been identified and interpreted as a political approach of religious tolerance for peaceful co-existence in the political community. This is not new to India, since it is known for religious tolerance. Consequently, the Indian version of secularism has been widely interpreted in the country as equal regard for all religions (Sarva-dharma-sambhava),[21] and opposition to communalism. Communal conflicts are endemic in many parts of India.[22]

Evidently, as implied in the Constitution of India, secularism refers not to the exclusion or marginalisation of religion from the public sphere, but to a political and social order, wherein no one religion in its respective claim is preferred to the others. In a positive sense, it means that all religions are entitled, in their specific identities, to equal protection of the State. Precisely, this approach calls for the separation of the State from religion to make this polity to function so that the political goods of all communities are protected by the State. This happens only when the State in India is non-partisan, which requires in the logic of its functioning separation of the State from religion.

However, unlike the American concept of political secularism,[23] the Indian concept is not based on a theory of strict “wall of separation”[24] between the State and religion. Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all,[25] but the State in India is not debarred from providing religious assistance, provided it is on reasonable grounds and on non-sectarian basis.[26] Moreover, the State in India is empowered with extensive powers to intervene in matters related to religious practices.[27] Therefore, the concept of separation as provided in the secular provisions of the Indian Constitution has been taken to mean as the State keeping a “principled distance” from all religions. In other words, the State in India maintains a reasonable approach towards religion. The State’s intervention or non-intervention depends upon the nature of religious practices. The State intervenes when their practices are in contravention of the politically defined goods of the people, as individuals and as communities, in their respective community identities, to organize their ordinary lives in a manner worthy of human dignity. The defining idea of Indian State’s principled distance seems to be based on a humanistic secular approach towards State and religion in order to secure a dignified life for all its citizens.

One of the defining traits of India of all ages is its culture of unity in diversity. It is the co-existence and integration of different religious, cultural, racial and regional strands but respecting their diversity and not resorting to homogeneity. Multiculturalism is integral to Indian way of life. The constitutional term for this is “composite culture.”[28] It is the duty of every Indian citizen to value and preserve it.[29] At the time of national struggle for independence, Maulana Azad, a towering Muslim leader, has succinctly articulated this unique character of the Indian society. He pointed it out in his presidential address given to the plenary session of the Indian National Congress held in 1940. He said, “It was India’s historic destiny that its soil should become the destination of many different caravans of races, cultures and religions. Even before the dawn of history’s morning, they started their trek into India and the process has continued since.”[30] Recently this has been recalled by Mr. K.R. Narayanan, the late President of India, in his Republic Day address delivered to the nation in 1999. He said:

The unity of our nation is not based on any monolithic idea, but on our age-old tradition of tolerance, which is at once a pragmatic concept of living together, and a philosophic concept of finding truth and goodness in every religion. Long ago, Mahatma Gandhi put it very simply: “I do not expect the India of my dream to develop one religion, i.e., to be wholly Hindu or wholly Christian or wholly Mussalman, but I want it to be wholly tolerant with its religions working side by side with one another.”[31]

The founders of modern India saw that secularism was a relevant political answer to India’s diversity, especially religious diversity, which is also known as the culture of pluralism.[32]  They saw that the value of human dignity is embedded in a culture that esteems diversity. They knew well that the culture of pluralism, especially religious pluralism, has a symbiotic affinity with Indian ethos, which should not be legislated away but should be incorporated into the Constitution. Thus the framers of the Constitution ensured it by making secularism one of the constitutive premises of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution. They made it clear that respect for diversity in the political community is an affirmation of human dignity.[33] Consequently, Constitution recognises the inalienable worth and dignity of every person as a moral subject to seek the truth and to organize one’s way of life in consonance with one’s conviction of conscience. This takes us to brief on the secular provisions of the Constitution of India and their specific contents.

Articles 25 to 30 of the Constitution of India contain the secular provisions. They serve as instruments to order a civil society wherein people are free from coercion to seek the truth and organize their lives as responsible subject of the society. In this regard, articles 25 and 26 guarantee individual and corporate freedom of religion. This is generally secured in most of the constitutions under liberal democratic polity. In positive terms, these articles affirm that the individual and corporate freedom of religion in a free society is to be a fundamental human right and thereby this right is to be protected by juridical guarantee as a civil right. In negative terms, these articles also imply that coercion in matters religious is to be rejected as an offence against the inalienable worth and dignity of human person as moral subject.

However, the entitlement to free exercise of religion as provided under articles 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution is subject to many qualifications and restrictions[34] with the objective of giving protection of human dignity. First of all it is subject to public order, morality and health. Secondly, it is subject to the fundamental rights, which are enjoyed by all in the political community as guaranteed in Part III of the Indian Constitution. The free exercise of religion is guaranteed under the conditions of these humanistic objectives of the secular State since they are essential values needed in the society for people to lead an ordinary life with dignity. Thirdly, all persons are equally entitled to religious freedom. The doctrine of egalitarian anthropology adopted in articles 14 to 18 is inbuilt in article 25. Fourthly, this freedom applies to individuals and to corporate bodies. One need not be a member of a religious association or denomination or any section thereof for the entitlement to religious freedom. This has been aptly nuanced by placing the right to freedom of conscience prior to the right to profession, practice and propagation of religion.[35] These articles protect diversity of beliefs and ways of life and their peaceful co-existence in a pluralistic society, which ensures to people security to lead a life worthy of human dignity.

According to article 27, the Constitution incorporates yet another dimension to the Indian conception of secularism. This article specifically prohibits the State from levying tax the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated for the maintenance or promotion of any particular religion or religious denomination. This provision equally implies that the State in India shall neither establish a religion of its own nor confer any special patronage upon any particular religion, but the State is not anti-religious.[36] The prohibition against discrimination implied in these articles also means that whatever aid or encouragement the State may give, it should ensure the benefit of all religions.[37]

Article 28 deals with an individual’s freedom from attending religious instruction or religious worship in certain educational institutions. This article provides that no religious instruction shall be imparted in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds.[38] However, this does not apply to an educational institution administered by the State but has been established under an endowment or trust which requires that religious instruction shall be imparted in such an institution.[39] This article further stipulates that no person attending any educational institution recognised by the State or receiving State aid shall be required to take part in any religious instruction that may be imparted there or to attend any religious worship that may be conducted there, unless such a person or, if such person is a minor, his / her guardian has given consent to it.[40]

Article 28 also lays down a specific distinction between educational institutions wholly maintained out of State funds and those recognized by the State or receiving State aid. The imparting of religious instruction is wholly prohibited in the former, but no prohibition is attached to the latter from imparting religious instruction or conducting religious worship. This article reiterates a distinction between the sacred and the secular spheres, their co-existence in the society, and the dignity of the persons as moral subject by protecting them from coercion either by the State or any power in deciding their way of life in the civil society. 

Similarly, articles 29 and 30 empower the minority communities based on language, culture or religion to conserve their respective community identities. These articles are the pointers that the Constitution is committed to conserve the rich heritage of India’s composite civilisation in order to provide space in the civil society for people to organise their lives in a manner fitting to their inalienable worth and dignity as moral subject of the political community.

The need to define religion was raised for the first time by B.R. Ambedkar when the matter pertaining to personal law and its relation to religion came for discussion in the Constituent Assembly. He pointed out:

The religious conceptions in this country are so vast that they cover every aspect of life from birth to death. There is nothing which is not religion and if personal law is to be saved I am sure about it that in social matters we will come to a standstill… I personally do not understand why religion should be given this vast expansive jurisdiction so as to cover the whole of life and to prevent the legislature from encroaching upon that field. [41]
The Indian Constitution has no explicit definition of ‘religion’ or ‘matters of religion’. Under the directive of article 32 of the Constitution, which provides the right to constitutional remedies, it is left to the Supreme Court to decide on the judicial meaning of such terms. In the early 1950s in a number of cases the Courts in India had been faced with the problem of defining ‘religion’ as given in article 25 (1) and ‘matters of religion’ as provided in article 26 (b).

The Supreme Court of India has held a principled approach towards religion when appealed for judicial definition of ‘religion’ and ‘matters of religion’ protected under articles 25 (1) and 26 (b) of the Constitution. As a general rule, it has maintained a liberal definition of religion – as assumed in most of the liberal democratic States – covering in its ambit belief, doctrines and moral codes, rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship.[42] However, in some cases, the Supreme Court did not hesitate to pass a strict definition of ‘matters of religion’ as protected under clause (b) of article 26 of the Constitution limiting them only to those essentials and obligatory overt acts necessary to express one’s faith.[43] These are the instances where the Court found that certain acts of rituals though sanctioned by a particular religion, if allowed to perform would violate, on reasonable grounds, social solidarity and even cause harm to life.[44] 

In the context of a religiously plural society like India, where conflicting value systems often compete with each other, the principled approach of the Supreme Court on religious matters is to promote religious freedom that secures human dignity. Therefore, the Court may apply a liberal or a conservative approach towards religion depending on which of the two better promotes religious liberty consistent with a set of values that protect the sanctity of human life and provide a life-affirming space for all to live in dignity.

Hence, the Indian judiciary tells in unambiguous language that the Constitution recognises the importance of religion in people’s life, and that it holds religious liberty as a fundamental value of the Indian political community but not at the cost of certain substantive principles which are necessary in the society for all to lead a life worthy of human dignity.

Religions thrive in India. In this context, the principled approach founded on reason as held by the Indian Supreme Court regarding religion is an important requirement to keep religions to be authentic in their practices. Such an interpretation of religion would remind believers to shed away non-religious and, at times, even unreligious accretions added to religious practices. It would enlighten the followers of various faith traditions not to thwart the legitimate activities of the State to further the cause of human dignity.


4. Religious freedom and human dignity
The Constitution of India guarantees religious freedom, which is indigenous to Indian religious ethos and to its socio-cultural context so as to satisfy the multi-religious tradition of the country. Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience. However, clause (2) of article 23 does not oblige exemption to conscientious objectors on religious scruples from compulsory service of the State when services of this sort are necessary for public welfare and for the security of the country.[45]

As interpreted by the Courts, article 25 (1) protects religious practices that are essential or integral to a religion. Owing to the delicate communal situation, which is endemic in some parts of the country, these practices are, however, subject to overriding regulatory measures of the State under sub-clause (a) of clause (2) of article 25 that saves any State statute to regulate and restrict secular transactions and activities associated with religious practices.[46] Although religious practices protected under the provision of clause (1) of article 25 are free from State regulation unless detrimental to public order, morality, health and the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution, nevertheless these practices cannot be protected if they contravene social welfare and reform measures initiated by the State as provided under sub-clause (b) of clause (2) of the same article.[47]

This dialectical process of freedom and regulatory measures amounting to the State’s non-intervention and intervention associated with the practice of religion brings out clearly the fundamental dynamics of the philosophy of Indian secularism as enshrined in the secular provisions of the Constitution. It means that the Constitution is committed to protect values that enhance the flourishing of human life in dignity. Therefore, the free exercise of religion cannot supersede these objectives of the nation reposed in the Constitution.


5. State’s aid to religion
The State in India is free to tax or grant tax exemption to religious institutions on the condition that in either approach there is no discrimination against any religion or any section thereof. As a matter of fact, religious institutions enjoy tax exemption in India. This is a form of assistance the State grants to religion. However, the Supreme Court has observed in some instances that the State is entitled to impose levy on religious institutions if the proceeds are meant to pay the administrative and maintenance expenses when the State takes care of the vast religious properties and ceremonies within the purview of religious Endowments.[48] It has been held that such levy measures would not amount to infringement of religious freedom protected under articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. It is, moreover, constitutionally valid for the State to extend direct financial assistance for even purely religious purposes if such assistance is non-discriminatory.[49]

Similarly, the Constitution guarantees to all minority educational institutions the entitlement to State aid. In granting aid to educational institutions, the State is prohibited to exclude any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority whether based on religion or language.[50] Furthermore, educational institutions run by the religious denominations are free to impart religious instruction. The State, at the same time, safeguards the freedom of the individual person by guaranteeing a conscience clause.[51]

This means firstly, the political philosophy of Indian secularism does not opt for a theory of absolute separation between State and religion, but commits for a model of secular State that expands the space needed in the civil society for the growth of religious pluralism on reasonable grounds.[52] It treats religion as an important institution of a free society for people to organize their way of life according to their perspectives of God and the good. Hence, through various provisions,[53] the Constitution not only protects religious freedom but also does not prohibit the State to grant indirect or direct aid to religion if such aid is non-discriminatory.[54]

Secondly, the constitutional entitlement to minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice and State aid for the same[55] is the recognition of the fact of multifaceted pluralism of the Indian people. Once again, the framers of the Constitution made it clear that the civil society is characterized by diversity of community identities, such as the religious, cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity as well as the composite character of Indian people by way of coexistence as a national community of communities in one nation-state under a secular polity.[56]

Thirdly, the affirmation of the religious, cultural, ethnic and linguistic identity of the communities by way of constitutional safeguards is the confirmation of the value of dignity in diversity accorded to each community as a human community in their specific community identities in a plural society. This is a veritable substantiation of the fact that the value of human dignity is central to the political philosophy of Indian secularism.

6. Humanistic secularism

The preceding study of the secular provisions of the Constitution of India indicates that the framers of the Constitution envisaged a particular form of secularism that is appropriate to Indian ethos as well as responding to the political need of the country.  As a political ideology for the governance of the State, the Indian secularism stands for the separation of the State from religion, equal protection of all religions – popularly known as respect for all religions (Sarva-dharma-sambhava) and active opposition to communalism. This particular form of secularism embedded in the secular provisions of the Constitution is not hostile to religion. It also does not marginalize religion from public sphere but the State keeps a principled distance from all religions. 

The Constitution, moreover, approves intervention of the State to care for the welfare of religious institutions.[57] By virtue of articles 27 and 290 - A, it would not be constitutionally invalid for the State to extend direct financial assistance even for purely religious purposes, if such assistance is non-sectarian. It also means the autonomy of the State and religion in their proper sphere of function in the society.[58] The State and religion are seen not opposed to each other but in an ambience of harmony and cooperation, because religion is protected, from the humanistic point of view, as an institution to care for an important human need in view of integrated development of the people under the auspices of liberal democratic political system.[59]

Under the Indian form of secularism, the State is, nevertheless, empowered to intervene with secular practices associated with religion for the purpose of social and religious reform. Likewise, the State in India has wide powers to regulate religious freedom to maintain the public order, morality and health. These measures may contravene the free exercise of religion. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has justified these legislative measures of the State.[60]

The free exercise of religion is also subject to the other provisions of the fundamental rights as spelt out in Part III of the Constitution. It is because the Constitution’s Preamble and the various provisions of Part III and IV of the Constitution explicitly enunciate that the positive content of the political freedom consists in establishing an egalitarian social order informed by the principles of the welfare State.[61] This purpose of the constitutional vision is to create a mighty solidarity of all citizens of India and to safeguard the dignity of the individual as well as to protect the unity and integrity of the nation.

In pursuance of these ideals, the State in India has been empowered to enact legal measures for social welfare and reform. Religious beliefs and practices that contravene these legislations, which are intended to promote all round welfare of the people consistent with the progressive enhancement of human dignity, must be redefined and updated in order to create space for these State measures. In this connection, when article 17 together with article 15 (2) (4) and article 25 (2) (b)[62] have the revolutionary potential to carry forward social reform and to transform the caste ridden Indian society into an egalitarian social order, wherein the inalienable worth and dignity of each individual person as a moral subject is affirmed and protected by the secular law of the Constitution.

These outstanding features of the secular provisions of the Indian Constitution lead us to classify Indian secularism as humanistic secularism. We qualify it as humanistic, because the constitutional approach towards the separation between religion and State and their co-operation as well as State’s intervention in the matters associated with the free exercise of religion are governed predominantly by some substantive moral and social values intrinsic to human nature, which protect human dignity.[63] From the anthropological point of view, implicit in this humanistic character of the Indian form of secularism is a belief in the inalienable worth and dignity of the human person as a moral subject in one’s self-identity and the community of persons in their distinct community identities in the pluralistic society. In other words, the constitutional approach to individuals is seen in terms of dignity and social nature of the person. Human dignity is inclusive of the social nature of the person. This humanistic value significance of the Indian form of secularism is known from the constitutional objectives of making India a secular State.

The first of its objectives is to provide a secular political order that protects religious liberty worthy of human dignity which is also expected to promote a sense of human solidarity among all citizens in the religiously plural society as well as to protect the unity of the nation.[64] On account of this constitutional objective, the Constitution grants separate rights to minority communities, whether based on religion, culture or language,[65] to enable them to live with dignity in their plural community identities. It is because the philosophy of the humanistic secularism of the Indian Constitution believes, that pluralism adds richness to political community as against ethnic or religious regimentation in terms of homogenisation leading to totalitarianism.

The second objective is to ensure security to people’s lives and property against religious bigotry[66] and to manage interreligious conflicts, but subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of the fundamental rights, to allow religions to have their proper space in the public sphere.[67]

The third objective is to create a social order in a free society on the principles of justice and egalitarian anthropology.[68] In this regard, Constitution prohibits discrimination on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth;[69] and outlaws the practice of untouchability in any form.[70] Every individual person will have, in that order, an equal right to freedom of conscience and free exercise of religion. The operations of these substantive values through constitutional institutions guide the process of humanisation of the Indian society. These are the benchmark of the philosophy of humanistic secularism embedded in the Indian Constitution as they protect human dignity.

The fourth objective is to empower the State through the law to enact legal measures for social and religious reform.[71] Some of these legislations may affect religious beliefs and practices in so far as they are in contravention of the measures legislated by the State, which are intended to promote all round human welfare, consistent with the progressive enhancement of human dignity.[72] In pursuance of this objective, the Central and State Governments in India have carried out social and religious reforms by declaring sati [73] and untouchability crimes punishable in accordance with law.[74] The State and Central Governments in India have abolished the practice of child marriage and the devadasi system; introduced the temple-entry rights to Dalits, and declared by law polygamy illegal.[75] These reforms have been pursued on humanistic grounds to create a social order founded on human dignity and to protect from violation the ordinary life of the citizens so that people may arrange their way of life in a manner worthy of human dignity in a free society.

Hence, the State’s intervention or non-intervention in religious matters is guided by non-sectarian principles. These constitutional principles are in consonance with humanistic ethics, which is intended to promote a life of equal dignity for all in such a way that individuals and communities of people are enabled to relate themselves in the civil society by way of peaceful coexistence.[76] Therefore, the philosophy of humanistic secularism conditions the principled distance that the State in India keeps from religion, so that people, as individuals and communities in their specific personal and community identities, may benefit the politically defined goods in a manner worthy of human dignity.

7. Human dignity centred political theology
The dignity or the sacredness of the human person and the social nature of the person are two fundamental principles of theological anthropology. These principles rest on the understating from Genesis that God created human persons in God’s image and likeness. The Church’s social teaching is based on these anthropological principles. Gaudium et Spes, which gives a systematic treatment of the foundations of the social teaching of the Church, insists on these two anthropological principles.[77] Further, Dignitatis Humanae, applies these principles as the foundations of political community and human rights.[78]It is on the basis of dignity and social nature of the human person, the Second Vacation Council takes a proactive approach towards the world and engages with it in dialogue and collaboration in finding solutions to human problems.

The Council holds that created in the image of God[79] and redeemed by Christ,[80] every person in his or her transcendent dignity[81] is the centre and subject of all activities in the world.[82] This Christian vision of human person sets forth the basic theological structure of the entire exposition of this document. The relevant portion of the passage states:

For sacred Scripture teaches that man was created “to the image of God”, is capable of knowing and loving his creator, and was appointed by Him as master of all earthly creatures that he might subdue them and use them to God’s glory…
But God did not create man as a solitary. For from the beginning “male and female he created them” (Gen. 1:27). Their companionship produces the primary form of interpersonal communion. For by his innermost nature man is a social being, and unless he relates himself to others he can neither love nor develop his potential (GS, 12).

This passage contains a set of fundamental principles of theological anthropology. They are collated from the Bible and Patrology.[83] The passage highlights three important aspects of human dignity, namely the dignity of the human person in relation to God, which is construed as human capacity for communion with God (capax Dei); the dignity of work; and the dignity of societal life, which underscores the relational nature of human person.

Among them, the first constitutes the religious dimension of human life and the other two are about life in the secular world. The first is the horizon and in its background radiance the other two aspects of human dignity, namely the dignity of human activities in the world and the dignity of the social life are explained.[84]

First of all, Council makes a categorical distinction between the content or the essential meaning, and the essential consequences of creating human persons in God’s image. Taking its position from Augustine’s thought,[85] Gaudium et Spes interprets the essential content of the “image of God” (imago Dei) as capacity for God (capax Dei), qualifying it as capacity for “knowing and loving” God, which is the foundation of human transcendence.[86] In other words, Gaudium et Spes reiterates the classical theological position that the reason for the dignity of the human persons is that they are created with capacity to know and love God, which constitutes human transcendence. Capacity for God signifies human freedom for God which is the ultimate horizon of all freedoms and, therefore, also of human dignity. Hence, the human capacity to know and love God, and to have communion with God as God’s children is the content or the essential meaning of creating human persons in God’s image. This capacity for God bestows on every person a value, which cannot be reduced to any other aspects of life in the temporal order but surpasses them all. Accordingly, later magisterial teaching qualifies this aspect of the human dignity as transcendent dignity[87] because it is rooted in God and perfected in God.

Secondly, the passage emphasises two essential consequences of creating human persons with capacity for God (capax Dei). The first of the two essential consequences is the dignity of work, which comprises the world of human activities. It is generally known as the human activities in the secular realm. It is because human persons have the capacity for communion with God, they are “appointed” to have dominion over the world.[88] In other words, since human persons have capacity for interpersonal communion with God, God can entrust to them the work of God and they can own responsibility. They are called to involve themselves in the work of God, realise their divine destiny.[89]

The second essential consequence of the human capacity for God is the dignity of social life. For the text underlines, “God did not create man as a solitary.”[90] Therefore, the human capacity for God is the condition for the possibility of societal life. Capacity for God (capax Dei) is the reason that they are social by nature (socialitas), which is the foundational principle for building up human communities.[91] It means that, by their very nature, human persons are relational subjects. The institutions of family and political community are the foremost among them as they relate with greater immediacy to people’s innermost relational nature.[92]
           
The first political principle emerging from the insights of theological anthropology is that human dignity and the relational nature of the human person are the criteria for fundamental rights; foremost among them is the freedom of conscience and free exercise of religion. The violation of the fundamental rights is a serious attack on the inalienable worth and dignity of the people as moral subjects; because it prohibits their right to seek the truth and to organise their lives in accordance with their judgments of conscience.[93] Therefore, a constitutional government enjoys limited powers. 

The second principle is that the State is a natural institution. It is founded on the social nature of the people, which is a necessary consequence of their creation in the image of God.[94] The purpose of the State is for the protection of the common good so that all people, as ordained by God, benefit the goods of creation in a just way.[95] The concept of common good[96] avoids the extremes of individualism/liberalism and collectivism/ totalitarianism. Individualism negates the good of the society, while collectivism destroys the good of the individual for the sake of the society. On the contrary, the concept of the common good aligns the good of the individual and of the community in the civil society on the basis of an egalitarian anthropology and welfare State. In this manner, by promoting common good, the State protects the values of dignity and the social nature of the people by promoting a humane social order.

The third principle is that religious freedom as a constitutional right affirms the value of pluralism in the society. As a civil right, religious freedom means that everyone has the right to follow the religion of one’s own choice or reject them all. Consequently, the right to religious freedom requires that the political community ought to respect the inherent worth and dignity of each person in his or her self-identity and the community of persons in their plural community identities, because religious faith provides enduring and powerful identity both to individuals and communities in the civil society.[97] Hence, religious freedom recognises the political community as a plural society and the State is duty bound to protect its plural character.[98]

The fourth principle is that the distinctions arising in the constitutional order of the State, namely the distinction between the sacred and the secular, State and society, and common good and public order, are the protective distinctions to avoid the violation of human dignity. These distinctions function as instruments to respect and promote the values of a free society founded on the principle of human dignity.[99]

The fifth principle is the necessary harmony and cooperation that should exist between religion and State.[100] This is based on the fact that both are necessary institutions divinely ordained in the nature of human persons to take care of two necessary needs, namely the spiritual and temporal needs.[101] Both institutions are independent and autonomous in their respective order of function. They are empowered by their respective sources of legitimation.[102] Religion derives its legitimation from a spiritual source, while the State receives its legitimate power from the consent of the governed; but both meet in the conscience of the individual person who is both a citizen and a believer. Therefore, the protection of human dignity demands functional harmony between religion and State for the integral welfare of the people for whose good religion and the State exist in the society.

The reason to have necessary cooperation between religion and State arises from the necessary harmony that should exist between the two institutions. The contribution of each to the other is indirect but necessary, because both have their respective responsibilities for the societal life of the people. Religion is at the service of the society to impart spiritual and moral values. These are substantive values in defence of human dignity.[103] The State provides the legal/constitutional structures that are conducive for the need of the people in order that people may truly exercise their rights and duties in matters religious.[104]

 These political values, which are embedded in the theological anthropology – and, therefore, become part of political theology – are also found in a significant manner in the humanistic philosophy of Indian secularism. For both, dignity and social nature of the human person are the defining values in their respective approach to the political order.

8. Political theology and ethics of interhuman concern
We have noted that the philosophy of the humanistic secularism of the Indian Constitution and the theological anthropology of the Gaudium et Spes take human dignity and the social nature of the person as correlated values. This, I call relational anthropology. This means that the person who is endowed with dignity relates to the other who is also endowed with dignity. Relational anthropology naturally implies an ethics of interhuman concern because it is concerned with the care of the other. It is one’s moral imperative to care for the other in his /her dignity as a human person.

Let us see the application of relational anthropology in the Indian Constitution in its mode of operation guided by the secular provisions of the Constitution.     As explained elsewhere, the principled distance that the State in India keeps from religion or from any group of people in their specific community identities, is guided by a set of non-sectarian principles consistent with certain essential humanistic values. These are the regulating values to promote a life of equal dignity for all in the political community in such a way that individuals and communities of people in their specific community identities are enabled to coexist in harmony.[105]
From the anthropological point of view, implicit in this approach is a belief in the inalienable worth and dignity of the human person as a moral subject in one’s personal identity and the community of persons in their distinct community identities in the pluralistic society. In other words, the constitutional approach to individuals is seen in terms of their dignity and social nature. Hence, the person is seen in his or her dignity as a freely choosing, morally committed (i.e., a moral subject), and socially related individual (i.e., a relational being).[106] This means that the person who is endowed with dignity is social by nature. In this case, the human rights, which are intended to protect human dignity, are interpreted not in an individualistic sense, but in a relational (social) context with a strong sense of social responsibility to promote social welfare, especially the welfare of the weaker sections of society and the common good. In other words, the individual person in his / her dignity is seen not as a monad but as a member of a community in a society. This interrelated approach to human person under the aspects of dignity and relational (social) nature is what we mean by relational anthropology.

The first consequence of the relational anthropological approach is that the constitutional rights of the individuals are accompanied with a strong sense of duty to protect the common good or to care for others. This would become clear when we examine article 19 of the Constitution.[107]  Clause (1) of article 19 provides six kinds of freedom. These are generally guaranteed in all constitutions of the liberal democratic polity. The scheme of the article 19 is that clause (1) provides with several kinds of freedom and clauses (2) to (6) of the same article enumerate cases in which the said rights to freedom can be regulated by the State for the common good or for social welfare and     reform.

It means that the secular Constitution of India does not subscribe to an approach, which absolutises the liberty of the individual as advocated by the philosophy of value-neutral liberalism, propagated by social philosophers like John Stuart Mill and others. John Stuart Mill, for instance, propounded the theory that the only freedom, which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. According to him, all restraint, qua restraint, is an evil.[108]

Surely, liberty of the individual is an essential feature of the secular Constitution of India.[109]  But when “the right of the individual is in sharp conflict with the claims for the public good, the former has to yield to the latter,”[110] and must submit to the principle of common good. Therefore, the individual rights are judicially interpreted in the context of common good on account of the interdependence of people based on their social nature. What is implied here, from the ethical point of view, is an “ethics of interhuman concerns,” that is, to care for the other.

Let us now look into the principle of relational anthropology underpinning the theological anthropology. Obviously, it is based on the doctrine of imago Dei. According to theological anthropology, human dignity and social nature are correlated. These are the divine endowments rooted in the creation of human persons in the image of God. Human persons are image of God, since God has given them the capacity for interpersonal communion with God (capax Dei),[111] the absolute Thou.[112] This is the foundation of their dignity as persons, endowed with reason and freedom as well as inalienable rights and obligations, to seek after the truth and to organise their life in responsible freedom.[113] Capacity for God is also the condition necessary for the possibility of relating to the other and to live in community.[114] So, the rights and obligations are grounded in the dignity of every person who is called to live in communion with God and in solidarity with others.[115] This has been concisely given in the Pastoral Constitution:

God, who has fatherly concern for everyone, has willed that all men should constitute one family and treat one another in a spirit of brotherhood. For having been created in the image of God…all men are called to one and the same goal, namely, God Himself…For this reason, love of God and neighbour is the first and greatest commandment…Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when He prayed to the Father, “that all may be one…as we are one”…opened up vistas closed to human reason. For He implied a certain likeness between the union of the divine Persons, and in the union of God’s sons in truth and charity. This likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through sincere gift of himself (GS, 24).

Obviously, the structure of the relational anthropology is self-evident in the above passages. Theological anthropology sees human person in relationship with God, other people and earthly realities. Accordingly, in keeping with the biblical insight of relational anthropology, the theological anthropology of the Gaudium et Spes stresses on the rights and duties, and brings out the importance of common good and public order.[116] Definitely, here too, from the ethical point of view, the emphasis is on interhuman concerns. Christians learn about the ethical policy of interhuman concerns from the story of Jesus and from the values of the God’s kingdom that he shared with us.

The kingdom values are the values of interhuman concerns, because these are the concerns of a God, who cares for the people created in God’s image as shown in the person and the ministry of Jesus. Consequently, by the mystery of Incarnation, humanity has become the locus of encounter with God, and God-experience is mediated to us in and through interhuman concerns. All kinds of works people do and all institutions, which uphold and promote the ethics of interhuman concerns, protect people in their dignity and, therefore, reflect the Kingdom ideals.

The Kingdom ideals, which Jesus inaugurated, are geared towards creating human communities of freedom, fellowship and justice[117] for the humanisation of people and their institutions. These are the acts of interhuman concerns, precisely because they are the concerns of human care for the protection of human dignity, beginning with the least in the society, the anawim,[118] to whom dignity is denied in the society. It is with these category of people Jesus identified his mysterious presence.[119] In the Kingdom that Jesus proclaimed, every person is respected in one’s dignity as the living image of God, and equality of all are affirmed as children of God. The kingdom ideals Jesus shared are essentially fellowship and communion among people who accept the reign of God and its demands. The call of the Kingdom is basically communitarian. Kingdom is the loving and liberating presence of God among people as incarnated in Jesus.

The ethics of interhuman concerns as seen in the Kingdom ideals of Jesus resonates with the concerns of political institutions in so far as they are in some way rooted in relational anthropology. The reason is that, from the ethical point of view, the world vision of the relational anthropology is humanistic in character. It is directed towards the creation of a humane social order, which operates against the forces of oppression and dehumanisation in the political community. The world vision of the relational anthropology sets forth in the society a counter-culture, which is inclusive and pluralistic as well. It implies commitment for the care of the other in the society, a readiness to defend human life as against a culture of deprivation of the neighbour. There is no space under relational anthropology for the question: “Am I my brother’s keeper?”[120] In short, the values rooted in the relational anthropology are the values that support human dignity. In theological parlance, these values are intrinsic to the doctrine of imago Dei. They have a transcendent significance in the theologico-ethical order when seen in the Christological horizon.

The philosophy of the humanistic secularism enshrined in the Constitution of Indian is based on relation anthropology, since the spirit and the tenor of the ethics of interhuman concerns animate its secular provisions. Consequently, it reflects the Kingdom ideal that Jesus proclaimed. As political principles, the values of interhuman concerns operate through the ‘idea of principled distance’ that the State in India keeps from religion and from the interests of all communities, because its objective is to humanise the Indian society in a manner worthy of human dignity. In this regard Article 25 of the Indian Constitution is typical in its revolutionary character in humanising the Indian society.

Article 25 is a key article of the secular provisions of the Indian Constitution. This article provides the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom but subject to so many conditions: to public order, morality and health, and to the other fundamental rights guaranteed to all citizens. In other words, if under the guise of freedom of conscience or religious freedom, any citizen performs an act, which is inconsistent with these constitutional conditions, that act will not be protected in the public sphere under article 25. It is due to the reason that under the philosophy of humanistic secularism, the State in India has to balance the benefit of a religious act with the common good which protects a civilised life for all.
           
This is made explicitly clear once again by the provisions as provided in clause (2) of article 25, since this clause empowers the State to make laws regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other non-religious activities that may be associated with religious practice. These regulatory measures of the State cannot be impeached on the ground that they impede religious freedom. Similarly, if social reform or social welfare measures are introduced in any Legislature, they cannot be challenged on the ground that these legislations contravene or intrude into religious tenets, beliefs, practices or community interest, etc.

What one sees in the constitutional objectives implied in article 25? Obviously, religion itself is subject to a process of humanisation.  Religion is challenged to be humane. Recall sabbatical laws cannot subjugate what is truly of human concern![121] This is how the Kingdom values of interhuman concerns operate through the secular provisions of the Indian Constitution because its underlying vision of the human person is guided by the ethics of relational anthropology. Certainly, “God’s Spirit…is not absent”[122] from the constitutional objectives, since they are intended for the humanisation of the Indian society keeping in view to defend of human dignity, which is a divine endowment for creating human beings in God’s image.

In so far as the secular Constitution of India is based on relational anthropology, it is committed to humanising values, because these values are based on the ethics of interhuman concerns. Indeed, these values of humanisation are also articulated in the Preamble of the Constitution that contains the ideals and the aspirations of the people of India, who gave to themselves a Secular Constitution. These are given in the Preamble in terms of securing to all citizens social, economic and political justice; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; equality of status and opportunity; promotion of human solidarity (fraternity) among citizens with the aim of assuring the dignity of the individual as well as the unity and integrity of the nation.[123]

These constitutional objectives, which are given in the form of socio-economic and political policies of the secular State, govern in guiding individuals’ relationship with the State as citizens and their intercommunity relationship in the political community. They reflect the values of the Kingdom as they are guided by the ethics of interhuman concerns, namely care and respect for the other. These constitutional provisions and institutions influence the relationship of citizens in the political community to secure human dignity.

Seen theologically, these secular provisions of the Constitution of India are also the call of God, “the signs of the times,” in the Indian political scenario. They articulate, in the political context of India as a nation-state, the cherished will of the people to create a welfare State for a better human life.  Hence, together with the civil society, the Church in India is invited to respond to this call – “the signs of the times.” Its purpose is to strengthen the humanistic secular fabric of the political community in a manner proper to human dignity. It is precisely at this point that the role of the Church comes in as a partner in dialogue and collaboration with the civil society.


[1] . J.B. Metz, Theology of the World (New York, Herder & Herder, 1969), 107. See also A. Kee, ed., The Scope of Political Theology (London, SCM, 1978);J. Motlmann, The Crucified God (New York, Harper & Row, 1974).
[2] The value of human dignity is constitutive of the constitutional vision of India, as it has been explicitly referred to in the Preamble of the Constitution. See the Preamble of the Constitution of India.
[3] . Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.
[4] . Social encyclicals of the Popes are founded on these principles, see Charles E. Curran, Catholic Social Teaching (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2002), p. 132.
[5] Rajeev Bhargava, “What is Secularism for?” in Secularism and Its Critics, op.cit., p. 488.
[6] Daily life means ordinary life as distinct from a life spent in the pursuit of some ultimate ideals towards higher time or eternity. Ibid., pp. 490-491.
[7] C. Taylor, “Modes of Secularism”, ibid., p.32.
[8] Ibid, p. 33.
[9] Rajeev Bhargava, “What is Secularism for?”, Ibid., p.  493.
[10] Ibid., p. 35.
[11] “In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the USSR is separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognised for all citizens.” Article 124 of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1936).
[12] Rajeev Bhargava, op.cit., p. 493.
[13] Ibid., p. 494.
[14] Article VI, 3, of the Constitution of the United States reads: “[N]o religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.”
[15] First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (1791) reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…”
[16] A.B. Keith, Constitutional Law (London, Stevens & Sons, 1939), pp. 406-407. On account of the established Church in England, Prof. E. Barker, remarked that it was not a secular state. See Ernest Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory, reprint (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 77.
[17] Article 44, 1(2) of the Constitution of Ireland (1937) recognizes the special position of the “Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens.” Nevertheless, no special privilege is granted to it before the law because article 44, 2(2) declares: “The State guarantees not to endow any religion.”
[18] The Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia (1947) declares that “Buddhism is the State religion” but article 8 guarantees to all “liberty of conscience and worship.”
[19] The terms ‘communal’ or ‘communalism’ generally denote in the Indian usage a process of exclusive mobilization of a particular religious community on powerful religious symbols for non-spiritual benefits such as social, economic and political in a manner which is detrimental to the legitimate interests of other communities or of the nation as a whole. Communalism usually provokes violence against other communities, religious or non-religious, which are presumed as obstacles in achieving the objectives of the communal group. For an extensive study see B. Chandra, Communalism in Modern India (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1989).
[20] T.De Bary, ed., Sources of Indian Tradition (New York / London, Columbia University Press, 1958), vol. II, p. 150 f; K.M. Panikkar, Foundations of New India (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1963), pp. 75-90; A.K. Saran, “Secular-Sacred Confrontation: A Historical Analysis”, in Religion and Society, vol. VIII, no. 3 (September 1971), pp.9-35; S. Chandra, “ The Indian National Movement and Concept of Secularism”, in B. Chakrabarty, ed., Secularism and Indian Polity (New Delhi, Segment Book Distributors, 1990), pp. 69-71.
[21] Gandhiji popularised it among the people.  See “Gandhiji and Secularism”, in Bipan Chandra, op.cit., pp. 115-118. For the Constituent Assembly debates on secularism see CAD, vol. VII, pp. 612-882. For scholars` views see S. Radhakrishnan, “Forward”, in Abid S. Hussain, The National Culture of India (Bombay, Jaico Publishing House, 1956), pp. vii-viii; P. B. Gajendragadkar, The Constitution of India: Its Philosophy and Basic Postulates, reprint (Nairobi, Oxford University College, 1972), pp. 40-41; Sarla Jhingran, Secularism in India (New Delhi, Har-Anand Publications, 1995), pp. 142-143. For extensive critiques of the use of the concept of secularism in the Indian polity see Ved Prakash Luthera, The Concept of Secularism and India (Calcutta, Oxford University Press, 1964); V.K. Sinha, ed., Secularism in India (Bombay, Lalwani, 1968); T.N. Madan, “Secularism in Its place”, in Secularism and Its Critics, op.cit., pp. 297-320; Ashis Nandy, “The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance”, ibid., pp. 321-334; H. Srikanth, “Secularism and Pseudo-Secularism”, op.cit., pp. 76-99.
[22] It has been reported that from 1947 to 1980, over 5000 cases of communal riots have been recorded. See A. R. Desai, “Caste and Communal Violence in Post-Partition Indian Union”, in Asghar Ali Engineer, ed., Communal Riots in Post-Independent India (Bombay, Sangam Books, 1984), pp. 10-41.
[23] For a comparative study of the concept of political secularism in India and United States of America see Wilfred M. McClay, “Two Concepts of Secularism”, in Span (January-Feb., 2001), pp. 7-27.
[24] Alvin W. Johnson & F.H. Yost, Separation of the Church and State in the United States       (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1948), p. 12.
[25] Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.
[26] Articles 27 of the Constitution of India.
[27] Articles 17, 25, 26 and 38 of the Constitution of India. P. B. Gajendragadkar, op.cit., pp. 13-22; K.M. Panikkar, Hindu Society at Cross Roads (Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1955), pp. 40-47.
[28]  Article 51-A (f), Constitution of India.
[29]  Ibid.
[30] Quoted in Sonia Gandhi, “Conflict and coexistence in our age” in Seminar, no. 521 (January 2003), 38-42, at 39.
[31]  Quoted in P.D. Mathew, Hinduism, Hindutva and Secularism (New Delhi, Indian Social Institute, 1999), p. 138.
[32]  Bipan Chandra, Essays, op.cit., pp. 84-85.
[33] The value of human dignity is constitutive of the constitutional vision of India, as it has been explicitly referred to in the Preamble of the Constitution. See the Preamble of the Constitution of India.
[34]  “Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion”. Article 25 (1), Constitution of India. This formula is repeated also in article 26, which secures corporate freedom of religion.
[35]  P.K. Tripathi, “Secularism: Constitutional provision and judicial review”, in G.S.Sharma, ed., Secularism: Its implications for law and life in India (Bombay, N.M.Tripathi, 1966), pp. 165-194.
[36]  P.B. Gajendragadkar, op.cit., pp. 39-43.
[37]  Article 30 (2), Constitution of India.
[38]  Article 28 (1), Constitution of India.
[39]  Article 28 (2), Constitution of India.
[40]  Article 28 (3), Constitution of India.
[41] CAD, vol. 7, p. 781.
[42] Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282, at 290.
[43] Mohammad Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731, at 739; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638, at 1660-1661.
[44] It is particularly true in the case of cow sacrifice on Bakr-Id day and hurting the religious sentiments of the Hindus. Ibid. at 745. See also the debate on the subject, which took place in the Constituent Assembly: CAD, vol. 7, and pp.568-581.
[45] “Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service for the public purposes, and in imposing such service the State shall not make any discrimination on grounds only of religion, race. Caste or class or any of them.” Article 23 (2) of the Constitution of India.
[46] “ Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law –
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice.” Article 25 (2) (a) of the Constitution of India.
[47] “ Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law –
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all casts and sections of Hindus.” Article 25 (2) (b) of the Constitution o India.
[48] Commissioner, Hindu religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.; Kidangazhi Manakkal Narayanan Nambudiripad v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad 385; Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa, AIR 1954 SC 400.
[49] Articles 27 and 290-A of the Constitution of India.
[50] Clause (2) of article 30 of the Constitution of India.
[51] Clause (3) of article 28 of the Constitution of India.
[52] This was singularly emphasized in a case that came before the High Court of Madras when the court held valid clause (1) of section 76 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, (Madras Act 19 of 1951). The impugned section of the Act authorised the State to collect 5 per cent of the annual income of the Hindu temples covered under the Act to pay the salary to the officers appointed under the Act. The court held constitutionally valid the State’s power to collect a contribution from temple income. While discussing various sections of the Act, the High Court of Madras noted that the Indian Constitution did not have provision like the establishment clause in the American Constitution. The court said: “It must be noted that while Arts.25 and 26 reproduce the law as enacted in the second clause of the First Amendment, there is nothing in our Constitution which corresponds to the first clause therein. The inference is obvious that the framers of our Constitution were not willing to adopt in its entirety the theory that there should be a wall of separation between Church and State which the first clause of the First Amendment was interpreted to embody.” See Kindangazhi Manakkal Narayanan Nanbudiripad v. State of Madras, AIR 1954, Mad 385, at 390. Our emphasis is in italics.

[53] Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.
[54] Articles 27 and 290-A, of the Constitution of India.
[55] Article 30 of the Constitution of India.
[56] Bipan Chandra, Essays, op.cit., pp. 84-85.
[57] Some of the State Government and Central Government enactments for state intervention are the following: The Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, 1951 (Madras Act 19 of 1951); The Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 1 of 1951); The Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 (Bombay Act 29 of 1950); The Mussalman Waqf Act, 1923 (Act 42 of 1923); The Charitable and Religious Trust Act, 1920 (Act 14 of 1920); etc.
[58] This has been especially stressed when the Supreme Court of India was appealed to define “matters of religion.” See Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Matt, AIR 1954 SC 282, at 290; Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388, at 391-392.
[59] See debate in the Constituent Assembly, CAD, vol. VII, pp. 818-882; Keshavanand Bharti v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461, at 292-294, 297,299, 302, 624,682.
[60] See The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom. 84; Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388; Mohammad Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731; Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255; His Holiness Srimad Perarulala Ethiraja Ramanuja Jeeyar Swami v. The State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 1586; Acharya Jagadiswaranda Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police Calcutta, (1984) SCC 522.
[61]. In its solemn affirmation, the Preamble of the Constitution of India resolves “to promote among them all [among all citizens of India] FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation.” Preamble of the Constitution of India. In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, while commenting on the purpose of the fundamental rights as guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution, Justice P.N. Bhagawati of the Supreme Court of India said, “These fundamental rights …are calculated to protect the dignity of the individual and create conditions in which every human being can develop his personality to the fullest extent.” AIR 1978 SC 597, at 619.

[62] Article 17 of the Constitution abolishes untouchability. Clause (2) of article 15 prohibits discrimination against any citizen in any public place on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Clause (4) of the same article empowers the state for affirmative action for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes of the citizens or for the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. Sub-clause (b) of clause 2 of article 25 empowers the state to make any law providing for social welfare and reform or throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. Under this provision, the state can eradicate social practices and dogmas, which stand in the way of the progress of the country.
[63] Keshavanand Bharti v. State of kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461, at 292-297.
[64] See the Preamble of the Constitution of India; Keshavanand Bharti v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461, at 682.
[65] Articles 29 (1) conserves the linguistic and cultural pluralism. Article 30 (1) provides right to all religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administrate educational institutions of their choice.
[66] Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 1961 (Act 41 of 1961).
[67] Articles 25 and 26, of the Constitution of India.
[68] The Constitutional vision of a civil society on the principles of justice, equality, liberty and fraternity is given in the Preamble of the Constitution of India. The civil liberties in general terms are given in article 19 of the Constitution.
[69] Articles 15(1), (2); 16 (1), (2); 29 (2), of the Constitution of India. Articles 14 to 18 of the Constitution of India guarantee the right to equality in general. Article 14 guarantees equality in general. Article 15 prohibits discrimination. Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Article 17 abolishes untouchability and article 18 abolishes titles other than the military or academic distinctions.
[70] Article 17, the Constitution of India.
[71] Most of these reform measures had been initiated in India by the beginning of the 19th century by Indian Reformers. See R.C. Majumdar, History, op.cit., vol. 10, pp. 86-159, 256-310.
[72] Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282; Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255; Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388.
[73] Sati was abolished by law throughout India by 1929. See The Regulation XII of the Bengal Code passed on December 4, 1829. Crf. R.C. Majumdar, History, op.cit., vol. 10, pp. 268-275.
[74] Article 17 of the Indian Constitution abolishes untouchability and declares that its practice in any form is an offence publishable in accordance with law.
[75] The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom 84; Ram Prasad Seth v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 All 411.
[76] Article 25 (1) and article 26 of the Constitution of India.
[77] . GS,nn.3,12.
[78] DH, article 2.
[79] GS, article 12.
[80] Ibid, article 22.
[81] Ibid., articles, 12, 19.
[82] Pope John Paul II developed on this perspective of human person in his encyclicals and expounded the concept that human person is the subject of all activities, rights and duties in the world. He qualified human dignity as transcendent dignity. We have studied his thought on this subject in our previous chapter.
[83] Crf. Joseph Ratzinger, “The Church and Man’s Calling”, op.cit., p. 119.
[84] Yves Congar, “The Role of the Church in the Modern World”, op.cit., pp. 203-204; for a critical study on this subject see A. O. Erhueh, op.cit., pp.126-128.
[85] De Trinitate, XIV, 8, 11 (Quoted in Joseph Ratzinger, ”The Church and Man’s calling, op.cit., p. 121). St. Augustine used the term “capax Dei” to indicate human person’s innate capacity to recognize the Triune God. He also applied this term to human person’s natural capacity to love God and human person’s “obediential capacity” for God. For St. Augustine, human person means “openness to God”. During his protracted theological exploration into the mystery of human existence, he seemed to have inspired by the Scriptural text, Colossians 3:10, to define the essential nature of human person as “capax Dei”. For detail see John E. Sullivan, The Image of God: the Doctrine of St. Augustine and its Influence, op.cit., pp. 50- 52 f, 76 f, 257 ff.
[86] Joseph Ratzinger, “The Church and Man’s Calling,” op.cit., p. 121.
[87] CA, nn.44, 46.
[88] GS, article 12, para 4.
[89] Ibid., articles 34, 35.
[90] GS, article 12, para 5. God’s calling of human persons into existence (i.e., human vocation to exist) is always communitarian: see Otto Semmelroth, “The Community of Mankind”, op.cit., pp. 166-167.
[91] GS, articles 12, para 5; 25, para 1. Crf.  A.O. Erhueh, op.cit., pp. 158-160.
[92] GS, article 25, para 2.
[93] Ibid., article 3.
[94] GS, articles 24-25, especially article 12 ; 25.
[95] DH, article 6; GS, articles 26, 74
[96] Common good is an important theological concept in the Catholic social teaching. The Popes have consistently stressed on this value. See RN, nn.27-29; MM, nn.65.
[97] Ibid., article 7.
[98] Ibid., article 6; GS, articles 29-32, 73-74.
[99] DH, article 3; article 7; GS, article 19; article 26; article 76.
[100] GS, articles 40 – 41.
[101] GS, article 25
[102] GS, article 76; DH, article 13.
[103] DH, article 4, para 5; GS, article 40, para 5; articles 41-42;
[104] DH, article 4; article 6, para 2.
[105] Articles 25, 26, 29 and 30 of the Constitution of India. For the judicial interpretation of these articles with appropriate cases see above chapter 3, especially section 1.3.4: “The Exercise of Religion Subject to State Restriction”, p.161 ff.
[106] The religious dimensions of the freedom of choice, individual and corporate, etc., are given in articles 25 and 26. Other general categories of freedoms, individual and corporate, etc., are given in article 19 of the Constitution of India.
[107] The matters related to the practice of religion subject to common good, etc., have been discussed in detail in chapter 3. See above chapter 3, section1.3.4: “The Exercise of Religion Subject to State Restriction”, pp.161 ff.  This pattern is maintained in all provisions of the civil rights. 
[108] Crf. P.B. Gajendragadkar, The Constitution of India, op.cit., p. 28.
[109] See how the “freedom of conscience” is placed over and above religious freedom as such as given in clause (1) of article 25 of the Constitution of India.
[110] P.B. Gajendragadkar, The Constitution of India, op.cit.,  p. 29.
[111] GS, articles 12 and 19.
[112] Joseph Ratzinger, “The Church and Man’s Calling”, op.cit., p. 122.
[113] DH, article 2, paras 1-3.
[114] Joseph Ratzinger, The Church and Man’s Calling, op.cit., p.122; GS, article, 12.
[115] GS, articles 23, 24.
[116] GS, articles 26, 74, DH, articles 4 and 6
[117] George M. Soares-Prabhu, “The Kingdom of God: Jesus’ Vision of a New Society”, in The Indian Church in the Struggle for a Just society, op.cit., pp. 601- 607.
[118] On the poor of God in the understanding of Jesus and his option see idem, “Good News to the Poor! The Social Implications of the Message of Jesus”, in The Indian Church in the Struggle for a New Society, op.cit, pp. 609-626; Idem, “Class in the Bible: The Biblical Poor a Social Class?” in R.S. Sugirtharajah, ed., Voice from the Margin: Interpreting the Bible in the Third World (New York, Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 1991), pp. 147-171.
[119] Mt 25: 31-46. Serving the poor in the margins of the society seems to be the criterion on which one is judged on the Last Day.
[120] Gen, 4:9.
[121] Mk 2:23-28; Mt 12:1-8; Lk 6:1-5. For other sabbatical pronouncements see Mk 3:1-6; Mt 12:9-14; Lk 6:6-11.
[122] GS, article 26.
[123] See the Preamble to the Constitution of India. In Kesavananda Bharati case, the Supreme Court of India held that the Preamble is of extreme important and the Constitution should be read and interpreted in the light of the grand and noble vision expressed in the Preamble. See Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, Air 1973 SC 1461.These ideals of the nation as given in the Preamble have been further elaborated in Part III of the Constitution which contains the fundamental rights and in Part IV of the Constitution which provide the Directive Principles of the State Policies. Commenting on the Constitution of India, Granville Austin opined: “The Indian Constitution is first and foremost a social document. The majority of its provisions are either directly aimed at furthering the goals of the social revolution or attempt to foster this revolution…Yet despite the permeation of the entire constitution by the aim of national renascence, the core of the commitment to the social revolution lies in Parts III and IV…These are the conscience of the Constitution.” Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Corner stone of a Nation, op.cit., p. 50.

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